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INTRODUCTION 
 
Justice Sandra Day O’Conner wrote in Troxel v. Granville, “The 
demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of 
an average American family.”1 When assessing societal trends for 
cohabiting couples2 and their families, Justice O’Connor’s statement 
rings true. 
While the number of adults getting married in the U.S. has been 
falling, the number of couples living in cohabiting relationships is on 
the rise.3 Since 1990, the number of households led by persons in 
cohabiting relationships has nearly doubled from 3.1 million (3.4%) in 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; A.M., 2008, School of Social Service Administration, University of 
Chicago. The author would like to thank Matthew Kita for his suggestions and 
editorial assistance and Meaghan Sweeney, Emily P. Linehan, and Professor Hal 
Morris for their early feedback on this Comment. 
1 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
2 In this article, the term “cohabiting” refers to two unmarried persons who live 
together and likely engage in a sexual relationship. E.g., Cohabitation, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
3 PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW 
FAMILIES 21 (Pew Research Center 2010) (noting the percent of American adults 
who are married decreased from seventy-two percent in 1960 to fifty-two percent in 
2008).  
1
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1990 to 6.2 million (5.5%) in 2008.4 In 1990, over 2.1 million children 
aged seventeen and younger lived with two cohabiting parents. In 
2008, this number more than doubled to over 4.5 million children—
about 6% of all children in the United States.5 “[T]wo of every five 
children in the United States will spend time in a cohabiting household 
before the age of sixteen.”6 
In 2015, about 40% of all births in the United States were to 
unmarried women7—up from just 5% in 1960.8 The total number of 
births to unmarried women increased from 89,500 in 19409 to 
1,601,527 in 2015.10 Today, the majority of births to unmarried women 
are to women in cohabiting relationships.11 The percent of births to 
cohabiting women increased from 41% in 2002 to 58% in 2010.12 
Nearly half of all births to unmarried, cohabiting women were 
intended pregnancies.13 
The trend of fewer couples getting married but still having 
children poses interesting legal challenges. For example, The Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
                                                 
4 Id. at 112. 
5 CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 
159 (2010); TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 113. 
6 BOWMAN, supra note 5, at 159. 
7 Joyce A. Martin et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Births: Final 
Data for 2015, 66 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., January 5, 2017, at 1, 8. 
8 PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., GENERATION GAP IN VALUES, BEHAVIORS: AS 
MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL 
IMPACT 15 (Pew Research Center 2007). 
9 Sally C. Curtin et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Recent 
Declines in Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, NCHS DATA BRIEF, 
Aug. 2014, at 1, 2 (noting the number of births to unmarried mothers was 665,747 in 
1980; 1,527,034 in 2005; and 1,726,566 in 2008). The report also notes that the 
nonmarital birth rate has been on the decline for the past five years. Id. 
10 Martin et al., supra note 7, at 8. 
11 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 67. 
12 Curtin et al., supra note 9, at 4. 
13 Id. 
2
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(Hague Convention or Convention) protects parents with primary 
custody rights from parental abduction or retention of their children in 
another country.14 Under the Hague Convention, courts apply the 
domestic laws of the child’s country of habitual residence—a term 
described in greater detail below—immediately before the alleged 
abduction or retention to determine whether one parent has violated 
the other’s rights of custody.15 However, when unmarried couples have 
children, they do not always obtain court orders identifying each 
parent’s custody or visitation rights; they instead prefer to follow 
informal parenting arrangements.16 
In light of demographic trends towards fewer marriages, should 
jurisdictions like Illinois adopt child custody and paternity rules that 
endow rights of custody to both parents at birth or upon 
acknowledgement of the child? Two recent Seventh Circuit cases 
applying The Hague Convention demonstrate what is at stake.  
In Garcia v. Pinelo, Raul Salazar Garcia (Salazar) and Emely 
Galvan Pinelo (Galvan) never married nor lived together.17 But they 
did have a son together, D.S., in Mexico in 2002.18 In 2013, Galvan 
married another man, Rogelio Hernandez, and they decided to move to 
the United States.19 Salazar agreed for D.S. to accompany Galvan to 
Illinois for one year.20 After one year, when Galvan refused to return 
D.S. to Mexico, Salazar filed his petition under the Hague Convention 
to return his son to Mexico.21 In Garcia, the child’s habitual residence 
was Mexico. Applying Mexican domestic law, the Northern District of 
                                                 
14 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (1980) [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]. 
15 Id. 
16 See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and 
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 355–56 (2011).  
17 Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir. 2015).  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 1160. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
3
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Illinois found that Salazar had a right of custody under the Hague 
Convention and the Mexican law convention of patria potestad 
(parental authority).22 Consequently, Galvan violated Salazar’s 
parental rights by retaining D.S. in Illinois.23 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed this decision.24 
In Martinez v. Cahue, Jaded Ruvalcaba Martinez and Peter Cahue 
had a son, A.M., in Illinois in 2006.25 Martinez and Cahue never 
married.26 After their relationship ended, Martinez—who was a 
Mexican citizen—moved to Mexico with A.M. in 2013.27 In 2014, 
after Martinez sent A.M. to Illinois to spend his summer break with 
Cahue, Cahue refused to return A.M. to Mexico.28 Consequently, 
Martinez filed emergency proceedings in the Northern District of 
Illinois under the Hague Convention to return her son to Mexico.29 
The Northern District of Illinois found that because the parents did not 
have a shared intent for A.M. to relocate to Mexico, A.M.’s habitual 
residence under the Hague Convention remained Illinois and therefore 
A.M. should remain in Illinois.30 However, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the Northern District of Illinois. 31 The Seventh Circuit found 
that before Martinez moved to Mexico, she had sole custody of A.M. 
                                                 
22 Id. at 1159. In Latin, patria potestas means “power of the father.” Patricia 
Begné, Parental Authority and Child Custody in Mexico, 38 FAM. L. QTRLY 527, 
527 (Bruce McCann, trans., 2005). Today, in Mexico, the patria potestas 
convention, known in Spanish as patria potestad, references “parental authority.” Id. 
This paper will primarily refer to the parental authority convention by its Latin 
spelling, patria potestas, since that is how the Seventh Circuit typically references 
the convention. 
23 Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1159.  
24 Id.  
25 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016). 
26 Id. at 986. 
27 Id. at 987. 
28 Id. at 988. 
29
 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 991–92. 
4
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under Illinois law and that Cahue had no right of custody to prevent 
Martinez from moving to Mexico.32 
As described above, the domestic relations laws of one country 
over another can be outcome determinative. In Garcia, the Seventh 
Circuit found that Mexican law provides a right of custody to both 
parents known as patria potestas (parental authority) from the child’s 
birthdate or acknowledgment of paternity.33 In contrast, the Seventh 
Circuit found in Martinez that Illinois law presumes a mother has sole 
custody of a child born to unmarried parents in the absence of a court 
order. Unlike the Mexican laws of parental authority, Illinois law does 
not imbue an unmarried parent—even those who have acknowledged 
paternity—with custody rights.34 
In an era where fewer people are getting married but still having 
children, should jurisdictions like Illinois adopt child custody and 
paternity rules that endow rights of custody to both parents at birth or 
upon acknowledgement of the child? In order to protect children’s best 
interests and to preserve the status quo before an alleged wrongful 
retention or abduction, Illinois should not adopt a rule like parental 
authority laws. Illinois’s presumption requires a court to consider 
children’s best interests before awarding custody and visitation rights 
while parental authority laws automatically confers decision-making 
authority to parents. Children’s best interests are better served when a 
court protects stability and the status quo in children’s lives rather than 
enabling a parent to assert parental rights for the first time under a 
Hague Convention petition. 
This Comment will proceed as follows. Part I describes the 
provisions of The Hague Convention as well as compares the 
development of custody rights in Illinois and Mexico. Part II reviews 
the factual and procedural context of Garcia v. Pinelo and Part III does 
the same for Martinez v. Cahue. Part IV argues that Illinois’s 
presumption that an unmarried mother has sole legal custody of her 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 See Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir. 2015). 
34 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991. 
5
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children in the absence of a court order is a better right of custody rule 
than the parental authority laws.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
With rapid globalization in the late twentieth century, more people 
have begun marrying people from other countries.35 One of the 
challenges of increasingly open borders and easier means of travel is 
international parental child abduction.36 In order to create streamlined 
processes for returning children wrongfully removed or retained from 
their proper home country, more than twenty-three countries gathered 
in The Hague to create and adopt the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention).37 As of 
March 8, 2017, ninety-seven countries have either ratified or are in the 
process of being accepted as members to the Convention.38 The 
following sections will describe the provisions of the Convention as 
well as differences between the development of child custody laws in 
the United States and Mexico.  
 
A. The Hague Convention  
 
In 1981, the United States signed The Hague Convention and later 
implemented it in 1988 when Congress adopted the International Child 
                                                 
35 E.g., Kristy Horvath and Margaret Ryznar, Protecting the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 303, 303 (2015); Stephen I. Winter, 
Note, Home is Where the Heart Is: Determining “Habitual Residence” Under the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 J.L. & 
POL’Y. 351, 351–52 (2010). 
36 Winter, supra note 35, at 351. 
37 Hague Convention, supra note 14. 
38 Status Table: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=24 (last updated 
March 8, 2017).  
6
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Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).39 ICARA “entitles a person whose 
child has been abducted to the United States to petition in federal court 
for the return of the child.”40  
“[The Convention] is fundamentally ‘an anti-abduction treaty.’”41 
Its stated purpose is to “secure the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and to 
guarantee that the “rights of custody and of access” are respected 
across states that have adopted the convention.42  
Several public policies undergird the Convention. First, protecting 
the interests of children permeates the convention.43 Within the goal of 
protecting children’s interests is the presumption that stability is 
important to child development.44 When children are wrongfully 
moved from one country to another, they are torn from close-knit 
family members and friends, school settings, and religious 
institutions.45 The Convention is designed to return children to a status 
quo where parents can then contest custody rights.46 
Second, the Convention deters parents from international forum 
shopping. In other words, the Convention discourages parents from 
abducting their children and taking them to a country where the 
parents believe the country’s courts will be more sympathetic to 
                                                 
39 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 
437 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2012)). 
40 Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(b), transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (2012)).  
41 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garcia v. 
Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
42 Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99. 
43 Id. at Preamble, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98. 
44 Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report, ¶ 24, 3 ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF 
THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD ABDUCTION 431–32 (1982) [hereafter Perez-Vera 
Report]. 
45 Id. ¶ 24, 3. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and 
Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
46 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001(b)(4) 
(2012). 
7
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granting custody or decision-making rights over the children.47 Since 
states that have adopted the Convention agree to respect the “rights of 
custody and of access” of other member states, parents should have 
less incentive to engage in international tactical gamesmanship over 
their children.48 
The Convention applies only to member countries and to children 
who have been wrongfully removed or retained in member countries.49 
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, children are wrongfully 
removed when: 
 
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, 
an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, 
under the law of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the removal or 
retention; and 
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were 
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would 
have been so exercised but for the removal or 
retention.50 
 
In other words, a child is wrongfully removed or retained where the 
parent who abducts or retains the child violates the “rights of custody” 
of the other parent who actively asserted his or her rights as a parent. 
“Rights of custody” is a term of art in the Convention that is not 
directly synonymous with child custody jurisprudence in the United 
States.51 The Convention defines rights of custody as “rights relating 
                                                 
47 Winter, supra note 35, at 353–54.  
48 Id. 
49 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,504–505. 
50 Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99 
(emphasis added). 
51
 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,506-07; see also Melissa S. Wills, Note, Interpreting the 
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: Why American Courts Need to 
Reconcile the Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, the Best Interests of Abducted 
 
8
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to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to 
determine the child’s place of residence.”52 
The Convention also defines “right[s] of access” as “includ[ing] 
the right to take the child for a limited period of time to a place other 
than the child’s habitual residence.”53 The important distinction 
between rights of custody and rights of access is that the Convention 
only offers a return order for a breach of rights of custody.54 In other 
words, if a parent only has rights of access, he does not have a return 
order remedy under the Convention; he can only request that a 
Contracting State protect and enforce his rights of access.55 
Courts deciding Convention cases are not to consider the merits of 
underlying custody issues between the parties.56 Instead, courts are to 
focus on deciding where the child should be returned so that the courts 
in that jurisdiction can resolve the merits of any underlying custody 
disputes.57 
As such, courts do not enforce custody orders under the 
Convention.58 The Convention’s rationale for not enforcing custody 
orders is so that persons who wrongfully remove or retain a child 
cannot “insulate the child from the Convention’s return provisions 
merely by obtaining a custody order in the country of new residence, 
or by seeking there to enforce another country’s order.”59 The 
Convention reduces a parent’s incentives to abduct his children by 
requiring courts to apply the domestic laws of the child’s country of 
                                                                                                                   
Children, and the Underlying Objectives of the Hague Convention, 25 REV. LITIG. 
423, 441 (2006).  
52 Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at art. 3 & 8, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–100. 
55 Id. at art. 21, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 102. 
56 Id. at art. 19, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101. 
57 Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986); Perez-Vera Report, supra note 44, 
¶ 19, 3. 
58 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,504–505. 
59 Id. 
9
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habitual residence immediately before the alleged abduction or 
retention to determine whether one parent has violated the other’s 
rights of custody.60  
The Convention does not define the term “habitual resident.”61 
The Convention drafters did not want to bind courts to narrow legal 
definitions of nationality or domicile in order to give courts greater 
flexibility and thereby increase their ability to achieve the best 
interests of children.62  
The determination of a child’s habitual residence is often outcome 
determinative.63 For example, if the court finds that the child is 
presently located in her state of habitual residence, then her presence 
in the country is not wrongful.64 However, if the court finds that the 
child is not presently located in her country of habitual residence, then 
her presence in the country is likely wrongful unless the petitioning 
parent did not exercise his or her rights of custody.65 
In determining the location of the child’s habitual residence, the 
Seventh Circuit looks to whether parental intent to abandon the child’s 
previous habitual residence exists and whether the child has 
acclimatized to her new state of residence.66 Courts like the Seventh 
Circuit reason that children, particularly in cases involving young 
children, are not competent to make decisions about where they should 
live.67 Instead, courts should determine whether there was a settled 
parental intent to change the child’s habitual residence.68 The Seventh 
                                                 
60 Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99. 
61 See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Perez-Vera 
Report, supra note 44, ¶¶ 66, 83 (“The Convention, following a long-established 
tradition of the Hague Conference, does not define the legal concepts used by it.”). 
62 E.g., Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1071–72. 
63 E.g., Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 2016).  
64 E.g., Id. 
65 E.g., Id.  
66 Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Mozes, 239 F.3d 
1067).  
67 Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.  
68 Id.  
10
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Circuit has noted that “[t]he intention or purpose which has to be taken 
into account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of 
the child’s residence.”69 In this manner, the court must consider 
whether the intentions of one or both parents regarding where a child 
will live are legally relevant. Such intent does not have to be preserved 
in writing but can be inferred under the circumstances of each case.70 
For example, courts can consider whether a family moved together 
from one country to another, if the one parent unilaterally moved with 
the child, if the move was for a defined period or indefinite, etc.71 
The Seventh Circuit also considers the child’s acclimatization to 
her new environment.72 Factors indicating a child’s depth of 
acclimatization to a new environment include establishing friendships, 
relationships with extended family, “success in school, and 
participating in community and religious activities.”73 However, the 
Seventh Circuit has found that “in the absence of settled parental 
intent, courts should be slow to infer from [the child’s] contacts [with 
a new state] that an earlier habitual residence has been abandoned.”74 
 
B. U.S. v. Mexico: Comparing Custody Laws 
 
In general, child custody is comprised of two components: legal 
and physical custody.75 Legal custody is one or both parents’ ability to 
make significant decisions on behalf of the child, such as decisions 
                                                 
69 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990 (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 
747 (7th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis in original). 
70 Koch, 450 F.3d at 713 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075–76). 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 992. 
74 Koch, 450 F.3d at 713 (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079).  
75 Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35, at 305. 
11
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regarding education, healthcare, and religious upbringing.76 Physical 
custody centers on with which parent the child will live.77 
As discussed above, The Hague Convention secures the prompt 
return of children wrongfully removed or retained in a Contracting 
state.78 Courts determine whether a child was wrongfully removed by 
determining whether the parent who removed the child violated the 
petitioning parent’s “rights of custody” under the laws of the child’s 
state of habitual residence.79 Article III of the Convention provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
[R]ights of custody [. . .] may arise in particular by operation 
of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or 
by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law 
of that State.80 
 
Because rights of custody may arise from three sources (by operation 
of law, by judicial or administrative decision, or by effective 
agreement), understanding the differences in custody laws between 
Contracting states is crucial. The following sections will briefly 
describe differences in how the United States and Mexico approach 
custody law.  
 
1. United States 
 
In the United States, child custody law derives from both statutes 
and judicially created common law.81 Historically in the United States, 
fathers received custody of their children as they were viewed as 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98-99. 
79 Id. 
80
 Id. 
81 Antoinette Sedillo López, International Law: U.S./Mexico Cross-Border 
Child Abduction—The Need for Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. REV. 289, 294 (1999). 
12
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/10
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
278 
 
assets to the father’s estate.82 By the mid-nineteenth century, societal 
attitudes began to shift and the “tender years” doctrine emerged where 
legislatures passed laws to award mothers custody of children if the 
children were not yet old enough to work.83  
Over time, states abandoned “tender years” statutes in favor of 
those prescribing what is now commonly known as the “best interests 
of the child” standard.84 The purpose of the child’s best interests 
standard is to foster individualized determinations on a case-by-case 
basis that consider which or both parents would advance the child’s 
needs if he or she or both were given authority to make significant 
decisions for the child.85 
In the United States, the best interests of the child standard 
originated in the English common law as an extension of parens 
patriae (parent of the country),86 a common law doctrine, in part, 
empowering the State “to substitute its authority for that of natural 
parents over their children.”87 Custody statutes advancing the best 
interests of the child standard often enumerate factors a judge should 
consider in determining how to allocate custody to one or both 
parents.88 For example, Section 602.5(c) of the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) identifies fifteen best interest 
factors courts should consider, including “the child’s adjustment to his 
                                                 
82 HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 127 (1988). See also Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35, 
at 305–06. 
83 JACOB, supra note 82, at 128–29. See also Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35, 
at 305–07. 
84 E.g., JACOB, supra note 82, at 130–31 (1988). 
85 Horvath & Ryznar, supra note 35, at 309–10. 
86 Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 
St. Louis U. L.J. 113, 120-21 (2009).  
87 Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 
EMORY L.J. 195, 195 (1978).  
88
 E.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/602.5(c)(1)–(15) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. 
Sess.).  
13
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or her home, school, and community”; “the level of each parent’s 
participation in past significant decision-making with respect to the 
child”; and “the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and 
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent 
and the child.”89 
In Illinois, for children of unmarried parents, the Illinois 
Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act) defers to the IMDMA 
regarding custody and visitation proceedings.90 Section 802(a) of the 
Parentage Act provides in pertinent part, “In determining the 
allocation of parental responsibilities, relocation, parenting time, 
parenting time interference, support for a non-minor disabled child, 
educational expenses for a non-minor child, and related post-judgment 
issues, the court shall apply the relevant standards of the [IMDMA].”91 
Under the Parentage Act, unmarried parents can ask the Court 
to adjudicate their custody rights in a judgment.92 However, if 
unmarried parents have not adjudicated their rights through the courts, 
then Illinois law presumes, in the absence of a court order, that 
unmarried mothers have sole legal custody of their children.93 
                                                 
89 E.g., Id. §§ 5/602.5(c)(2), (5), & (11) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-
937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).  
90 Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(a) (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
91 Id. Note: Public Acts 99-85 and 99-769 replaced the terms “custody” with 
“allocation of parental responsibilities,” “visitation” with “parenting time,” and 
“removal” with “relocation” in the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 to conform with 
the Illinois General Assembly’s elimination of “custody” from the IMDMA in favor 
of “allocation of parental responsibilities.” Act of July 21, 2015, sec. 802, 2015 Ill. 
Laws Pub. Act 99-85 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016); Act of Aug. 12, 2016, sec. 802, 2015 Ill. 
Laws Pub. Act 99-769 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017).  
92 Id. See, e.g., In re S.L., 765 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that 
an unmarried father who established a father-child relationship could seek custody 
under the IMDMA and was entitled to a hearing to determine the child’s best 
interests).  
93
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. 
Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“It is presumed that, when the parties have never 
been married to each other, the mother has legal custody of the child unless a valid 
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Additionally, in the United States, unmarried couples cannot 
rely on private contracts or agreements related to child custody. In 
most American jurisdictions, private contracts between parents 
regarding child custody or support are void against public policy.94 
The reason courts refuse to enforce contracts regarding child custody 
and support is because such contracts may discourage parents from 
pursuing litigation in their children’s best interests.95 
 
2. Mexico 
 
Unlike the U.S. which follows the English common law tradition, 
Mexico follows the Roman civil law tradition of codified laws.96 One 
such Roman civil law tradition followed in Mexico is patria potestas 
(Latin: power of the father) or, in Spanish, patria potestad.97 
Historically, patria potestas gave fathers absolute power over their 
children and that power endured for life.98 Today, patria potestas—
parental authority—has been defined as “the duty and the right of 
                                                                                                                   
court order states otherwise. If an adjudication of paternity has been completed and 
the father has been assigned support obligations or visitation rights, such a paternity 
order should, for the purposes of this Section, be considered a valid court order 
granting custody to the mother.”) (emphasis added); Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 
§ 802(c) (“In the absence of an explicit order or judgment for the allocation of 
parental responsibilities [formerly custody], the establishment of a child support 
obligation or the allocation of parenting time to one parent shall be construed as an 
order or judgment allocating all parental responsibilities to the other parent. If the 
parentage order of judgment contains no such provisions, all parental 
responsibilities shall be presumed to be allocated to the mother; however, the 
presumption shall not apply if the child has resided primarily with the other parent 
for at least 6 months prior to the date that the mother seeks to enforce the order or 
judgment of parentage.”) (emphasis added). 
94 E.g., In re Marriage of Linta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130862, ¶ 14, 18 N.E.3d 
566, 570; Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998).  
95 E.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
96 Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 297. 
97 Begné, supra note 22, at 527. 
98 Id. at 529. 
15
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parents to provide assistance and protection to the persons and the 
property of their children to the degree necessary to fulfill their 
children’s needs.”99 Parental authority gives both parents the right to 
care and control their children and their children’s property.100 
Included within the right to control their children is the right to decide 
where the children live.101 
In Mexico, divorce of married parents or separation of unmarried 
parents does not automatically destroy parental authority rights.102 
Consequently, a Mexican parent should not remove his or her child 
without the other parent’s consent because both parents will maintain 
parental authority over their child absent a court order saying 
otherwise.103 This contrasts with the presumption in some American 
states that in the absence of a contravening court order, an unmarried 
mother has sole custody of her children.104 No such presumption of 
custody rights exists for unmarried fathers or partners of natural 
mothers. 
 
 
                                                 
99 Id. at 528 (citing IGNACIO GALINDO GARFIAS, DERECHO CIVIL MEXICANO 
656 (1999)).  
100 Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 413, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 
14-05-1928, últimas reformas DOF 24-12-2013 (Mex.) (“La patria potestad se ejerce 
sobre la persona y los bienes de los hijos. Su ejercicio queda sujeto en cuanto a la 
guarda y educación de los menores, a las modalidades que le impriman las 
resoluciones que se dicten, de acuerdo con la Ley sobre Previsión Social de la 
Delincuencia Infantil en el Distrito Federal.”). See Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 
297. 
101 Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 297. 
102 Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 416 (“En caso de separación de quienes 
ejercen la patria potestad, ambos deberán continuar con el cumplimiento de sus 
deberes y podrán convenir los términos de su ejercicio, particularmente en lo relativo 
a la guarda y custodia de los menores.”); See Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 297. 
103 Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 299. 
104
 E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. 
Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(c) (West, Westlaw 
through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
16
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II.  GARCIA V. PINELO 
 
A. The Facts 
 
Raul Salazar Garcia (Salazar) and Emely Galvan Pinelo (Galvan) 
dated briefly in 2001.105 They never married and they never lived 
together.106 Both are Mexican citizens, and, in 2002, both lived in 
Mexico.107  
During their brief relationship, Galvan and Salazar had a son, 
D.S., who was born in Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico in 2002.108 In 
2006, a Nuevo León court “entered a custody order recognizing 
Galvan and Salazar as D.S.’s parents.”109 Galvan was awarded 
physical custody of D.S. and Salazar was awarded weekly visitation, 
which he regularly exercised.110   
In 2013, Galvan married Rogelio Hernandez, an American 
citizen.111 In July 2013, Salazar and Galvan met to discuss Galvan’s 
desire to move to the United States.112 They both agreed that Galvan 
would move to Chicago, Illinois with D.S. for one school year.113  
In August 2013, Galvan and D.S. moved to Chicago and enrolled 
D.S., now 11 years old, in school.114 Salazar remained in touch with 
D.S. regularly through Skype and D.S. traveled to Mexico for winter 
break.115 During this time, D.S. told his father that he would like to 
                                                 
105 Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir. 2015).  
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1160.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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return to Mexico while simultaneously telling his mother he would 
like to remain in Illinois.116 
In July 2014, Salazar traveled to Chicago to take D.S. back to 
Mexico.117 Galvan refused to allow D.S. to return to Mexico with 
Salazar.118 Consequently, Salazar returned alone to Mexico where he 
filed his petition under the Convention with the Mexican Central 
Authority.119 On December 2, 2014, the U.S. Department of State filed 
Salazar’s petition in the Northern District of Illinois.120 
 
B. District Court Opinion 
 
The Northern District of Illinois appointed D.S. a guardian ad 
litem.121 In April 2015, D.S., now age 13, informed his guardian that 
he would prefer to remain in Chicago.122 During an in camera hearing, 
D.S. informed the judge that he wanted to remain in Chicago to finish 
eighth grade and beyond that if he could attend a good high school in 
Chicago.123 If he could not attend a good high school in Chicago, then 
D.S. did not oppose returning to Mexico.124 
In July 2015, the District Court found that Mexico was D.S.’s 
country of habitual residence.125 The Court also found that Salazar had 
the “right of patria potestas over D.S.,” which served as a right of 
custody for purposes of the Convention.126 Consequently, the District 
Court found that Galvan wrongfully detained D.S. in Illinois and that 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 1160–61.  
124 Id. at 1161.  
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
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D.S. needed to be returned to Mexico unless D.S. met the “mature-
child exception” of the Convention.127 The District Court found that 
although D.S. objected to returning to Mexico and was old enough to 
do so, retaining D.S. in Illinois would undermine the purposes of the 
Convention.128 The court reasoned that a primary purpose of the 
Convention is to deter parents from abducting their children to benefit 
from another jurisdiction’s laws.129 Permitting D.S. to remain in the 
United States would “set a precedent that allows a parent to prevent 
the return of a child by problems of his or her own making.”130 
 
C. Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
 
Galvan appealed from the judgment of the Northern District of 
Illinois to the Seventh Circuit.131 The case was heard by a panel 
consisting of Chief Judge Wood and Judges Manion and Hamilton.132 
At issue for the court was (1) whether Salazar established his custody 
rights under the Convention and (2) whether the District Court 
exceeded its discretion when it refused to “allow D.S. to stay in the 
United States pursuant to the Convention’s mature-child exception.”133 
On appeal, the parties did not challenge the fact that Mexico is D.S.’s 
habitual residence.134 
Writing a unanimous opinion, Chief Judge Wood found that 
Salazar did have an established right of custody under the Convention 
through the Mexican law of patria potestas (parental authority).135 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1168. 
130 Id. at 1168–69. 
131 Id. at 1161.  
132 Id. at 1159.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that the District Court did not 
exceed its discretion by ordering D.S. to return to Mexico.136 
 
1. Patria Potestas (Parental Authority) 
 
Chief Judge Wood recognized that the Seventh Circuit previously 
recognized patria potestas as a “right of custody” within the meaning 
of the Convention.137 The Court found that pursuant to the Nuevo 
León laws, parental authority “attaches automatically at birth or 
acknowledgment.”138 Since Salazar was D.S.’s acknowledged father 
since 2006, the parental authority right attached.139 The Court also 
found that although Galvan and Salazar entered into a custody 
agreement in 2006 the agreement did not destroy Salazar’s right to 
parental authority under Nuevo León law.140  
 
2. Mature-Child Exception 
 
The Seventh Circuit lastly considered whether the District Court 
abused its discretion when it did not permit D.S. to remain in the 
United States.141 The Convention’s “mature-child” exception provides 
that a court “may [ ] refuse to order the return of the child if it finds 
that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and 
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1164 (citing Altamiranda Vale v. Avila, 538 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 
2008)).  
138 Id. at 1166. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. Nuevo León Civil Code identifies events and conditions when the right 
of patria potestas (parental authority) will terminate, including death of the parent, 
child’s emancipation by marriage, child abuse, etc. Código Civil para el Estado de 
Nuevo Leon, arts. 443–48, Periódico Oficial 11-05-2016 (Mex.). 
141 Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1167. 
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views.”142 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that both 
conditions of the mature-child exception were satisfied in this case, 
namely D.S. objected to returning to Mexico and he achieved an age 
and maturity where it was appropriate for the court to consider his 
views.143 However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
discretion not to apply the exception.144 The court reasoned that the 
longer a child is wrongfully retained the more the child will acclimate 
to the new country.145 This can provide perverse incentives for parents 
to cause delays in Convention proceedings, which would frustrate the 
Convention’s purpose to “secure the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained.”146  
Underscoring its desire not to undermine the Convention by 
permitting a child to stay in a country where he was wrongfully 
retained, the Seventh Circuit found that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in ordering D.S. to return to Mexico despite 
satisfying the Mature Child exception.147 
In summary, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the 
district court and the district court’s order to return D.S. to Mexico.148 
Galvan did not request rehearing on this case or file a petition for writ 
of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
                                                 
142 Hague Convention, art. 13, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980). 
143 Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1167. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1169. 
146 Id.; Hague Convention, art. 1. 
147 Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1169. 
148 Id. 
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III.  MARTINEZ V. CAHUE 
 
A. The Facts 
 
Jaded Mahelet Ruvalcaba Martinez (Martinez) and Peter Valdez 
Cahue (Cahue) were in a relationship together, on and off, for nearly 
ten years.149 They never married and did not frequently live 
together.150 In 2006, Martinez gave birth to a son, A.M., in a suburb 
near Chicago, Illinois.151 Cahue voluntarily acknowledged paternity of 
A.M., and A.M. lived with Martinez from birth.152 In 2010, Martinez 
and Cahue signed a private, written custody agreement that provided 
Cahue liberal parenting time and that Cahue would “NOT fight 
custody in court for [A.M.].”153 However, neither Martinez nor Cahue 
attempted to “memorialize this arrangement in a court order.”154  
In 2013, Martinez decided to relocate with the parties’ son to 
Mexico, where she was a citizen.155 In Mexico, Martinez found 
employment and enrolled A.M. in private school.156 A.M. excelled in 
soccer, “spoke Spanish fluently, attended church regularly, and spent 
time with extended family.”157  
While Martinez and A.M. were in Mexico, Cahue consulted an 
attorney about his rights under The Hague Convention.158 However, 
Cahue never filed a petition under the Convention.159  
                                                 
149 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016). 
150 
Id. at 986. 
151 
Id. at 987. 
152 
Id. 
153 
Id.
 
154 
Id.
 
155 
Id.
 
156 
Id.
 
157 
Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
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On October 16, 2013, Martinez “filed a petition against Cahue for 
child support and an order of protection” in Mexico.160 However, 
Martinez withdrew her petition before the Mexican court ruled on it.161 
Shortly thereafter, Martinez and Cahue agreed to a visitation plan 
where Cahue would have parenting time with A.M. during his school 
vacations in December 2013, April 2014, and July 2014.162  
In December 2013, A.M. did not visit Cahue as planned.163 
Consequently, Cahue began corresponding with the U.S. Department 
of State.164 He was again informed of his rights under The Hague 
Convention and provided with “a blank petition for relief.”165 
However, Cahue never filed the petition.166 
Cahue’s parenting time with A.M. did proceed as planned in April 
2014.167 However, in July 2014, Cahue only purchased a one-way 
ticket for A.M., and Martinez refused to send A.M. to Illinois without 
a round-trip ticket.168 Cahue complied and Martinez sent A.M. to 
Illinois for the month of July.169 
On August 16, 2014, Martinez went to the airport in Mexico to 
pick up A.M., but he never arrived.170 Martinez called Cahue, who 
claimed he had forgotten about the flight.171 Later, Cahue stopped 
returning Martinez’s calls.172 On August 21, Cahue “contacted the 
                                                 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 987–88. 
166 Id. at 988. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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State Department and asked it to put A.M.’s passport “on hold” so that 
A.M. could not leave the United States.”173 
On August 25, 2014, Martinez traveled to Illinois to retrieve her 
son.174 She took A.M. from Cahue and returned to her parents’ home 
in Illinois.175 In the Illinois circuit court, Cahue filed a petition for 
custody and an emergency motion to prevent Martinez from relocating 
with A.M. to Mexico.176 The Illinois circuit court granted Cahue’s 
emergency motion and police seized A.M. from Martinez.177 Martinez 
retained counsel and filed a response to Cahue’s custody petition.178 
After a hearing on September 17, 2014, the Illinois court continued 
Cahue’s physical possession of A.M. and “ordered the surrender of 
A.M.’s U.S. and Mexican passports.”179 
Martinez returned to Mexico.180 “On February 6, 2015, she filed 
her petition under the Convention with the Mexican Central 
Authority.”181 “The U.S. State Department received the petition on 
March 13, 2015.”182 
 
B. District Court Opinion 
 
“[O]n December 15, 2015, after she discovered that Cahue had 
obtained a new U.S. passport for A.M., Martinez commenced 
emergency proceedings in the district court and filed her verified 
                                                 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
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petition in the Northern District of Illinois for A.M.’s return to 
Mexico.”183 
The Northern District of Illinois held an evidentiary hearing on 
the matter.184 The District Court found “that there was sufficient 
evidence that A.M. had acclimated to Mexico during the year he lived 
there with this mother.”185 However, the District Court also found that 
the parties did not share an intent for A.M. to relocate to Mexico.186 
Without “shared parental intent,” the District Court held that A.M.’s 
habitual residence was Illinois, that Cahue’s retention of A.M. in 
Illinois was therefore lawful, and dismissed Martinez’s petition.187 
 
C. Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
 
Martinez appealed from the judgment of the Northern District of 
Illinois to the Seventh Circuit.188 The case was heard by a panel 
consisting of Chief Judge Wood and Judges Bauer and Flaum.189 At 
issue for the court was (1) whether the district court properly identified 
A.M.’s habitual residence and, if not, (2) whether the parties had any 
defenses.190 Chief Judge Wood, writing a unanimous opinion, found 
that Martinez had sole custody over A.M. under Illinois law and held 
that Mexico was A.M.’s habitual residence.191 Finding that Cahue’s 
retention of A.M. was wrongful under the Convention, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the district court, ordering A.M. to be returned to 
Martinez in Mexico.192 
                                                 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 986. 
190 Id. at 989–90. 
191 Id. at 994. 
192 Id. 
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1. Habitual Residence 
 
Chief Judge Wood began her opinion underscoring the purpose of 
the Convention as “an anti-abduction treaty.”193 Chief Judge Wood 
next identified that the habitual residence determination is a mixed 
question of law and fact and that the standard of review of the district 
court’s determination is de novo.194 She noted that de novo review is 
essential both because the habitual residence determination is often 
outcome determinative for Convention cases195 and “to assure both the 
national and the international uniformity that the Convention was 
designed to achieve.”196 The Seventh Circuit reviewed findings of 
historical fact with deference.197 
Next, Chief Judge Wood assessed the two primary factors for 
determining habitual residence: (1) parental intent and (2) child’s 
acclimatization to the proposed home jurisdiction.198 She noted that 
the Seventh Circuit has tended to privilege parental intent but 
emphasized the fact-specific nature of the inquiry.199  
Regarding parental intent, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
district court wrongly considered Cahue’s intent for A.M. to remain in 
Illinois.200 Chief Judge Wood noted that “[t]he intention or purpose 
which has to be taken into account is that of the person or persons 
entitled to fix the place of the child’s residence.”201 The Seventh 
Circuit found that Cahue never asserted his custody rights under the 
                                                 
193 Id. at 989. See supra Section The Hague Convention. 
194 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 989. 
195 Id. at 988 (“[I]f a child is currently located in her habitual residence, her 
presence in the country (whether by removal or retention) is not wrongful.”). 
196 Id. at 989. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 990. 
199 Id. 
200
 Id. at 992. 
201 Id. at 990 (quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 747 (7th Cir. 
2013)) (emphasis in original). 
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 10
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol12/iss1/10
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                        Volume 12, Issue 1                            Fall 2016 
 
292 
 
Convention.202 Although Martinez and Cahue had written visitation 
agreements, neither Cahue nor Martinez ever entered them with a 
court.203 The court refused to enforce the agreements as against public 
policy.204 “In the absence of a court order, Illinois law presumes the 
mother of a child [of unmarried parents] has sole custody.”205 As such, 
“Cahue had no custody rights under Illinois law.”206 
The Seventh Circuit also found that a noncustodial parent like 
Cahue “has no right to determine the child’s location; he or she has 
only the right to ask a court to supervise.”207 At no point did Cahue 
invoke the Court’s powers to determine whether it was in A.M.’s best 
interests to relocate to Mexico.208 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that 
because Martinez had sole custody of A.M. under Illinois law and 
under the Convention, only her intent—to relocate to Mexico—
mattered.209 
Regarding the child’s acclimatization factor, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that the district court found “A.M. had acclimatized to Mexico” 
with “all of the indicia of habitual residence, including friends, 
extended family, success in school, and participating in community 
and religious activities.”210 The Seventh Circuit found the district 
court’s findings were not clearly erroneous.211 Thus the Seventh 
                                                 
202 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990. 
203 Id. at 990–91. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/10-5(a)(3)(2013) and 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(2) (2013)).  
206 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991. 
207 Id. (citing 750 ILCS 5/609(a) (2013)). Section 609 of the IMDMA was 
repealed in 2015. Act of July 21, 2015, sec. 5-20, 2015 Ill. Laws Pub. Act 99-90 (eff. 
Jan. 1, 2016). However, a substantially similar provision exists in the new Section 
609.2 of the IMDMA that replaces the term “removal” with “relocation.” Act of 
July 21, 2015, sec. 5-15, § 609.2, 2015 Ill. Laws Pub. Act 99-90 (codified at 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609.2, eff. Jan. 1, 2016). 
208 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991. 
209 Id. at 992. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
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Circuit held that because only Martinez’s intent to relocate to Mexico 
was of legal significance in this matter and because A.M. had already 
acclimatized to Mexico, Mexico was A.M.’s habitual residence.212 
 
2. Defenses and Aims of the Convention 
 
The Seventh Circuit noted that because the district court found 
Illinois to be A.M.’s habitual residence, the district court did not 
consider the “wrongfulness of Cahue’s 2014 retention of A.M., or any 
possible defenses that Cahue might have raised.”213 The Seventh 
Circuit decided not to remand the case since the case was sufficiently 
briefed and time-sensitive.214 
The Seventh Circuit first considered whether Cahue violated 
Martinez’s rights of custody under Mexican law.215 Noting that “Cahue 
admit[ted] that he retained A.M. in Illinois without Martinez’s 
consent,” the Seventh Circuit found that Cahue indeed violated 
Martinez’s custody rights.216  
Next, the Seventh Circuit considered whether any defenses Cahue 
raised applied to his wrongful actions: (1) whether Martinez 
acquiesced to his retention of A.M. or (2) whether “A.M. is now so 
settled in his new environment that he should not be returned” to 
Mexico.217 First, the Seventh Circuit found that Martinez never 
acquiesced to Cahue’s retention of A.M. in Illinois because she 
continuously exercised her custody rights by trying to remain in 
contact with A.M. and to regain physical possession of A.M.218 
                                                 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 992–93. 
216 Id. at 993. 
217 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
218 Id. 
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Second, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the “settled-child” 
defense for public policy reasons.219 The Seventh Circuit found that 
Cahue had multiple opportunities to assert his parental rights but never 
did so before his wrongful retention of A.M.220 Instead, Cahue 
engaged in “self-help” by retaining A.M. in Illinois without permission 
and filing a custody petition in Illinois.221 The Seventh Circuit noted 
that “[t]he Convention achieves its aims both by returning children in 
individual cases and by deterring future abductions or wrongful 
retentions.”222 The Seventh Circuit found that returning A.M. to Cahue 
would “be quite damaging to the deterrent effect of the 
Convention.”223 
In summary, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the 
district court and ordered A.M. to be returned to Martinez in 
Mexico.224 The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en 
banc on July 29, 2016.225 On October 27, 2016, Cahue filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. As of March 11, 2017, 
the petition for writ of certiorari remains pending and was distributed 
for conference on March 17, 2017.  
 
                                                 
219 Id. at 993–94. 
220 Id. at 993. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224
 Id. at 994. 
225 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed 
(U.S. Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-582). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. When Decision-making Parental Rights are Conferred 
 
In both Garcia and Martinez, the natural fathers of the children at 
issue formally acknowledged their paternity. 226 This is important in 
both the United States and in Mexico. In both countries, a voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity will confer rights and duties on the 
parent.227 
However, in Mexico, patria potestas [parental authority] laws 
give parents who have voluntarily acknowledged paternity the right to 
exercise decision-making over the child’s life.228 In the United States, 
no such rights are automatically conferred to a parent who has 
voluntarily acknowledged paternity.229 Instead, the voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity serves as a basis from which a parent 
can seek the court’s determination of custody issues.230 In jurisdictions 
like Illinois, courts retain the power to make decisions about whether 
one or both parents shall have custody in order to protect children’s 
                                                 
226
 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 987; Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 
2015).  
227 
E.g., Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/305(a) 
(West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“[A] valid 
acknowledgment [. . .] is equivalent to an adjudication of the parentage of a child 
and confers upon the acknowledged father all of the rights and duties of a parent.”); 
Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 412–14, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 14-
05-1928, últimas reformas DOF 24-12-2013 (Mex.). 
228 Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 413; see Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 
297. 
229 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573 (West, Westlaw through all 2016 Reg. 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 8 of 2015-16 2d Ex. Sess.) (“The voluntary declaration of paternity 
shall be recognized as a basis for the establishment of an order for child custody, 
visitation, or child support.” (emphasis added)); Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 
§ 305(a)–(b).  
230 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573; Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 
§ 305(a)–(b).  
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best interests.231 For example, Section 602.5(a) of the IMDMA 
provides in pertinent part, “The court shall allocate decision-making 
responsibilities according to the child’s best interests. Nothing in this 
Act requires that each parent be allocated decision-making 
responsibilities.”232 In this manner, custody rights in the United States 
are not automatic—courts assign custody rights in the child’s best 
interests.  
Consequently, an unmarried parent who has voluntarily 
acknowledged paternity and whose child’s country of habitual 
residence follows the parental authority laws, like Mexico, will likely 
have a right of custody on which to prevail in a Hague Convention 
petition because the parental authority laws instill both parents with 
rights to determine the child’s place of residence.233 In contrast, the 
unmarried parent who has voluntarily acknowledged paternity and 
whose child’s state of habitual residence is a state like Illinois will not 
automatically have a right of custody under the Convention because 
states like Illinois do not automatically confer decision-making powers 
to such parents.234  
These outcomes bore out in both Garcia and Martinez. In Garcia, 
the parties’ child was born in Mexico.235 The child’s state of habitual 
residence was Mexico.236 Under Mexican law, since Salazar 
voluntarily acknowledged D.S. as his son, Salazar’s patria potestas 
rights attached.237 Thus when Galvan refused to return D.S. to Mexico, 
                                                 
231 E.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/102(7) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
232 Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, § 602.5(a) (emphasis 
added).  
233 Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 413; see Sedillo López, supra note 81, at 
297. 
234 See, e.g., Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, § 305(a)–(b). 
235 Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 2015).  
236 Id. at 1159.  
237 Id. at 1166. 
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she violated Salazar’s right of custody under The Convention and 
parental authority laws to determine where D.S. should live.238 
In contrast, in Martinez, the Seventh Circuit found that Cahue did 
not have any rights of custody under the Convention.239 In Martinez, 
although the parties’ child, A.M., was born in Illinois,240 Martinez took 
A.M. to live in Mexico when he was seven years old.241 After sending 
A.M. back to Illinois to visit his father for the summer, Cahue refused 
to return A.M. to Mexico.242  
Although Martinez filed a petition under the Convention to return 
A.M. to Mexico, the Seventh Circuit first considered whether Martinez 
wrongfully removed A.M. from Illinois in the first place.243 The 
Seventh Circuit likely made the right call to do so because the purpose 
of the Convention is to prevent parents from “obtain[ing] custody of 
children by virtue of their wrongful removal or retention.”244 Martinez 
should not prevail in her Convention petition if she removed A.M. 
wrongly first. 
However, the Seventh Circuit found that Cahue took no action to 
assert his custody rights before he engaged in “self-help” to keep A.M. 
in Illinois.245 As mentioned above, Cahue’s voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity only made him a parent; Illinois did not 
automatically confer custody rights to Cahue by virtue of his paternity 
acknowledgment.246 Because Cahue did not assert his parental rights 
in court before he retained A.M. in Illinois, he triggered the default 
                                                 
238 Id. at 1159.  
239 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 991 (7th Cir. 2016). 
240 
Id. at 987. 
241 
Id.
 
242 Id. at 988. 
243 Id. at 990. 
244 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 9001(a)(2) 
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
245
 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990. 
246 See Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/305(a)–
(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.).  
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custody laws in Illinois, which provide that “[i]n the absence of a court 
order, Illinois law presumes that the mother of a child [of unmarried 
parents] has sole custody.”247 Consequently, in the absence of a court 
order, Martinez had sole custody of A.M. and sole discretion as to 
where A.M. would live.248 Thus, under the Convention, Martinez did 
not violate any of Cahue’s rights of custody by removing A.M. to 
Mexico because Cahue did not have any under Illinois law to begin 
with.249  
But what about the private custody agreement Martinez and 
Cahue signed in 2010 promising Cahue liberal parenting time?250 
Article III of the Convention provides in part that rights of custody 
may arise “by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law 
of that State.”251 The commentaries to the Convention state that for 
private agreements to have legal effect they must not be prohibited by 
law.252 
As discussed above in Part I.B.1., private contracts or agreements 
related to child custody are generally unenforceable as against public 
policy in the United States.253 Only custody agreements supervised 
and approved by the court are permissible so that courts protect 
children’s best interests through the supervisory process.254 Cahue 
never attempted to memorialize his agreement with Martinez in a court 
order.255 As such, the private agreement was void as against public 
                                                 
247 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 990–91; Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, § 802(c).  
248 Martinez, 826 F.3d at 991. 
249 Id. 
250 
Id. at 987. 
251 Hague Convention, art. 3, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980). 
252 Perez-Vera Report, supra note 44, ¶ 70. 
253 E.g., In re Marriage of Linta, 2014 IL App (2d) 130862, ¶ 14, 18 N.E.3d 
566, 570; Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 (Wyo. 1998).  
254 E.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
255 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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policy and did not serve as an example of Cahue asserting his parental 
rights.  
What about the court order resulting from Cahue’s petition for 
custody in Illinois?256 This court order was filed after Cahue retained 
A.M. in Illinois without Martinez’s permission.257 Article 17 of the 
Convention provides in pertinent part: 
 
The sole fact that a decision relating to custody has been 
given in or is entitled to recognition in the requested State 
shall not be a ground for refusing to return a child under this 
Convention, but the judicial or administrative authorities of 
the requested State may take account of the reasons for that 
decision in applying this Convention.258 
 
The purpose of Article 17 is to “ensure, inter alia, that the Convention 
takes precedence over decrees made in favor of abductors before the 
court had notice of the wrongful removal or retention.”259 Cahue’s 
court order in Illinois is exactly the type of order the Convention 
contemplates. Cahue knew he could get a favorable hearing in Illinois 
and so he engaged in self-help by retaining A.M. in Illinois and sought 
refuge in its court system. The Convention is designed to halt court 
orders that would give effect to Cahue’s attempts to circumvent 
Martinez’s parental rights. As such, the court orders issued in response 
to custody petitions after Cahue’s retention of A.M. in Illinois cannot 
evince efforts to assert parental rights before A.M.’s retention in 
Illinois.  
                                                 
256 Id. at 988. 
257 Id. 
258 Hague Convention, art. 17, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980). 
259 Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
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B. How Outcomes Would Have Been Different 
 
1. Garcia v. Pinelo 
 
In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit found that Salazar had a right of 
custody under the Convention because he had a parental authority 
right under Nuevo León state laws by voluntarily acknowledging 
paternity of D.S.260 But what if Nuevo León, Mexico did not have 
parental authority laws and instead followed the laws of Illinois?  
In that case, Salazar would not have a right of custody under the 
Convention. Even though the parties did have a custody order from the 
court,261 Salazar still would not have a right of custody because 
Galvan was allocated physical custody of D.S. while Salazar was 
allocated weekly visitation.262 Under the Convention, Salazar’s court 
approved weekly visitation is not a right of custody—a right to 
determine the child’s place of residence.263 Instead, Salazar has a 
“right of access.”264  
Although Salazar would not have a right of custody to prevent 
Galvan from automatically retaining D.S. in the United States, Salazar 
would have rights arising out of the original court order allocating 
custody and visitation.265 The parties’ court order would enable 
Salazar to ask a court in either Illinois or Mexico to conduct a hearing 
to determine whether it is in D.S.’s best interests to remain in 
Illinois.266 In this manner, because Galvan and Salazar had a 
                                                 
260 Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir. 2015). 
261 Id. at 1160.  
262 Id.  
263 Hague Convention, art. 5(a), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980). 
264 Id. 
265 Id. arts. 3 & 21. 
266
 Id. art. 21; Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/413(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. 
Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/609.2(g) (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-
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preexisting, court-approved custody agreement, Galvan’s ability to 
relocate is encumbered by Salazar’s right to petition the court to make 
a best interest determination.  
 
2. Martinez v. Cahue 
 
The outcome would also be different in Martinez if Cahue could 
rely on parental authority laws. Unlike Salazar, Cahue did not have a 
court order allocating him any rights of custody or visitation.267 Thus 
Cahue could not overcome the default custody presumption under 
Illinois law and the Seventh Circuit found that only Martinez’s 
parental intent was relevant.268 
However, in a scenario where Cahue has parental authority rights, 
the Seventh Circuit likely would find that it would have to consider 
both Martinez’s and Cahue’s intent. Because Cahue, like Salazar, 
voluntarily acknowledged paternity of his child, the right of parental 
authority would attach immediately. With the right of parental 
authority, Cahue would have a right of custody on which to rely in a 
Convention petition. 
In this manner, when Martinez left Illinois to move to Mexico, he 
could have filed a Hague petition to return A.M. to Illinois because the 
parties lacked mutual intent for A.M. to relocate. Martinez would have 
an encumbered right of custody where she would be unable to relocate 
without a court determining whether relocation was in the child’s best 
interests.  
 
C. What’s the Better Rule? 
 
Mexico’s parental authority rights and Illinois’s presumption that 
an unmarried mother has sole legal custody of her children in the 
                                                                                                                   
937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); Código Civil Federal [CC], art. 416, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF] 14-05-1928, últimas reformas DOF 24-12-2013 (Mex.). 
267 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016). 
268 Id. at 991. 
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absence of a court order reflect different policy considerations. 
Ultimately, Illinois’s presumption is the better rule because children’s 
best interests are better protected.  
Parental authority rights, as originally conceived and as they have 
evolved in jurisdictions like Mexico, stand for the proposition that 
parenthood is rooted in the natural order of the world.269 As a natural 
consequence of the parent-child relationship, certain parental rights 
and powers automatically arise at a child’s birth or a parent’s voluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity.270 In other words, both parents—
regardless of marital status—have natural rights to make decisions 
about their children by virtue of the parent-child relationship.271 
However, in jurisdictions like Illinois, no such natural rights exist 
for unmarried fathers or partners of unmarried mothers. The parens 
patriae doctrine subordinates the natural rights of parents so that the 
State—through the courts—can guarantee that parents pursue their 
children’s best interests despite the parents’ separated or divorced 
status.272 
As discussed above, in the absence of a court order allocating 
parental responsibilities, Illinois law presumes unmarried mothers 
have sole legal custody of their children.273 The historical and practical 
reason for this presumption is that maternity usually is not questioned 
since a biological mother is present at birth.274 
Illinois’s presumption that an unmarried mother retains sole legal 
custody of her children in the absence of a court order is predicated on 
the assumption that unmarried fathers are not involved in raising their 
                                                 
269 Begné, supra note 22, at 528. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 527. 
272 46 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 19 (2016).  
273 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. 
Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(c) (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
274
 See, e.g., CENT. MINN. LEGAL SERVS. UNMARRIED FATHERS’ GUIDE TO 
PATERNITY, CUSTODY, PARENTING TIME AND CHILD SUPPORT IN MINNESOTA 5 (3d 
rev. ed. 2011). 
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children when the parents have not entered into a custody agreement. 
Presuming for a moment that this assumption is correct, enabling a 
parent to assert rights of custody for the first time in a Convention 
proceeding would undermine the stability of the children’s status quo 
where their mother made significant parenting decisions alone.  
However, the assumption that the absence of a court order 
signifies a lack of parental involvement may, in fact, not be true. As 
previously mentioned, many unmarried couples with children prefer to 
follow informal parenting arrangements without court orders.275 
Additionally, going to court is expensive and requiring unmarried 
parents to formalize their parenting arrangements in court may place a 
high burden on the most vulnerable unmarried parents.276 
Despite these shortcomings, Illinois’s presumption that an 
unmarried mother has sole legal custody of her children in the absence 
of a court order remains the better public policy. Allowing parents to 
assert rights of custody for the first time through parental authority 
rights enables such parents to circumvent children’s best interests 
through gamesmanship.  
For example, in Martinez v. Cahue, Peter Cahue consulted an 
attorney regarding his legal options.277 Yet he never followed through 
with filing a petition to allocate parental responsibilities and parenting 
time.278 He also researched his rights under The Hague Convention.279 
But knowing, in his own words, “[he] wouldn’t have won,” Cahue 
engaged in self-help by retaining A.M. in Illinois against Jaded 
Martinez’s wishes and deploying the Illinois courts to secure favorable 
custody orders.280 If Cahue had parental authority rights, he would be 
able to disturb the status quo without any court having previously 
                                                 
275 See Maldonado, supra note 16, at 355–56.  
276 BOWMAN, supra note 5, at 222. 
277 Martinez v. Cahue, 826 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2016). 
278 Id. 
279 
Id.
 
280 
Id. at 993. 
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considered A.M.’s best interests. Such a result rewards custodial 
gamesmanship rather than protecting A.M.’s best interests.  
A primary aim of the Convention is to deter parents from not only 
child abductions and wrongful retentions281 but also adversarial 
gamesmanship involving children.282 Such gamesmanship can take 
many forms, but courts are particularly concerned about deterring 
custodial parents from bargaining to retain legal and physical custody 
of their children by accepting reduced support payments.283 In Garska 
v. McCoy, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted: 
 
[W]e are concerned to prevent the issue of custody from 
being used in an abusive way as a coercive weapon to affect 
the level of support payments and the outcome of other issues 
in the underlying divorce proceeding. Where a custody fight 
emanates from this reprehensible motive the children 
inevitably become pawns to be sacrificed in what ultimately 
becomes a very cynical game.284 
 
Because adversarial gamesmanship, e.g., accepting lower support 
payments to retain custody, would not be in the children’s best 
interests, courts in jurisdictions like Illinois make best interest 
determinations in custody proceedings to make sure that the 
children—who often do not have a voice in the custody proceeding 
itself—are protected from the adversarial process.  
Illinois’s presumption is a better rule because it is narrow. The 
presumption only applies in the absence of a court order.285 Where 
                                                 
281 Hague Convention, Preamble, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 
U.N.T.S. 89 (1980). 
282 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
283 E.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W.Va 1981). 
284 Id. at 361. 
285
 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. 
Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/802(c) (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. Act. 99-937, 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
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unmarried parents have voluntarily acknowledged paternity and 
sought the court’s relief to adjudicate each parent’s custody rights, the 
presumption will not apply.286 Under The Hague Convention, a parent 
with a court order predating the alleged wrongful abduction or 
retention will more easily be able to argue that rights of custody or 
access exist.287 Moreover, even if a parent only has rights of access, 
the parent can still request under the Convention that Contracting 
States enforce and protect the rights of access.288 
More importantly, if the parties obtain a custody judgment 
contemporaneously with a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, 
then the parties will have gone through a process where the court has 
considered the child’s best interests.289 In contrast, an unmarried 
parent without a custody order who relies on parental authority laws as 
a right of custody under the Convention may not have had a court ever 
previously consider the child’s best interests. This essentially means 
that such a parent could assert his rights for the first time in court by 
filing a petition under the Convention rather than when the parent 
voluntarily acknowledged paternity in the first place.  
Whether a parent asserted parental rights before asserting rights of 
custody in a petition under the Convention matters because stability is 
important in children’s lives.290 Courts and practitioners agree that 
fostering stability in the midst of a family’s breakup is in children’s 
                                                 
286 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5(a)(3); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
46/802(c). 
287 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,506–07 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
288 Hague Convention, supra note 14, at art. 21, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 102. 
289 E.g., Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/602.5 (West, Westlaw through Pub. Act 99-904, 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
290 E.g., In re Marriage of Davis, 792 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). See 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2002) [hereinafter ALI 
Principles]. 
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best interests.291 Consequently, courts applying the best interests 
standard will often favor maintaining the status quo of custody 
arrangements in order to prevent disruption in children’s lives.292 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
As this article goes to print, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide 
whether to grant Cahue’s petition for writ of certiorari. Cahue’s actions 
are exactly the kind that the Hague Convention is meant to deter—self 
help and litigious gamesmanship at the expense of a child’s best 
interests. Illinois’s presumption that an unmarried mother has sole 
custody of her children in the absence of a court order prevents parents 
like Cahue from using the Hague Convention and laws like it to their 
tactical advantage. Although social trends in the United States point to 
less formal relationships—e.g., avoidance of the institution of 
marriage—and informal parenting arrangements, such informal 
parenting arrangements do not protect children’s best interests in the 
unhappy event the unmarried parents cannot agree as to how to raise 
their children. Requiring unmarried fathers or partners of unmarried 
mothers to obtain a court order to define their custodial rights adds 
formality to the family status that should help protect the children’s 
interests. In all likelihood, the Supreme Court will deny Cahue’s 
petition for writ of certiorari. But if it does grant certiorari, the Court 
should affirm the Seventh Circuit. 
                                                 
291 E.g., Davis, 792 N.E.2d at 394; See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 290, § 2.05 
cmt. i. 
292
 E.g., Davis, 792 N.E.2d at 394 (citing In re Marriage of Nolte, 609 N.E.2d 
381, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Sullivan v. Knick, 568 S.E.2d 430, 435 (Va. App. Ct. 
2002). 
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